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ON PARFIT’S WIDE DUAL PERSON-AFFECTING
PRINCIPLE
By Michal Masny
In the posthumously published ‘Future People, the Non-Identity Problem, and Person-Affecting Prin-
ciples’ (2017), Derek Parfit presents a novel axiological principle which he calls the Wide Dual
Person-Affecting Principle and claims that it does not imply the Repugnant Conclusion. This paper
shows that even the best version of Parfit’s principle cannot avoid this conclusion. That said, accepting
such a principle makes embracing the Repugnant Conclusion more justifiable. This paper further
addresses important questions which Parfit left unanswered concerning: the relative importance of indi-
vidual and collective goodness, comparisons involving unequal outcomes, how to understand individual
goodness, and whether incomparability at the level of individual goodness implies incomparability at
the level of overall goodness.
Keywords: Parfit, repugnant conclusion, population ethics, axiology, incomparabil-
ity.
I. INTRODUCTION1
How should we rank, in terms of their relative goodness, outcomes in which
different numbers of different people with lives of different personal goodness
exist? One might think that this could be done by appealing to
The Wide Person-Affecting Principle: ‘One of two outcomes would be in one way worse if
this outcome would be less good for people, by benefiting people less than the other
outcome would have benefited people’ (Parfit 2017, p. 129).
Derek Parfit first considers this Wide Principle in Reasons and Persons (1984), but
rejects it because it implies
1 Thanks to Tomi Francis, Jake Nebel, and Theron Pummer for excellent written comments,
and to Johann Frick and Jeff McMahan for illuminating conversations and words of encourage-
ment. My greatest debt is to Kacper Kowalczyk whose remarkable ability to explain complex
philosophical ideas by drawing simple diagrams on cafe napkins was an invaluable resource
throughout my time at Oxford.
C© The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Scots Philosophical Association and the University of
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The Repugnant Conclusion: For any outcome in which many people exist, all with very good
lives, there is a better outcome in which many more different people exist, all with barely
good lives.2
Over 30 years later, in ‘Future People, the Non-Identity Problem, and
Person-Affecting Principles’ (2017), Parfit returns to the Wide Principle. He
claims to have overlooked that there are two ways of benefiting people, not
just one. This observation is accommodated in a novel version of this principle
endorsed by Parfit:
The Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle: ‘One of two outcomes would be in one way better
if this outcome would together benefit people more, and in another way better if this
outcome would benefit each person more’ (2017, p. 154).
Parfit’s discussion of this principle is confined to just a few pages at the end
of his article. He claims that this ‘Wide Dual Principle does not imply the
Repugnant Conclusion’ (p. 157), but the argument has gaps and some impor-
tant questions are left unanswered. This is understandable – readers should
bear in mind that Parfit submitted ‘Future People . . . ’ in a state that he re-
garded as unfinished and an untimely death prevented him from completing
this project. Consequently, some interpretative and speculative work is neces-
sary to uncover the most accurate and the most plausible version of the Wide
Dual Principle.
This paper examines this Wide Dual Principle. Section 2 states essential
assumptions and outlines the wider theoretical framework in which this prin-
ciple is embedded. Section 3 offers a systematic explanation of the Wide Dual
Principle and of its implications in comparisons of equal outcomes. Section 4
shows, contra Parfit, that even the best version of this principle cannot avoid
the Repugnant Conclusion and argues that embracing this principle makes
accepting this conclusion more justifiable. The remainder of this paper turns
to issues which Parfit left unaddressed. Section 5 discusses the relative im-
portance of the two components of the Wide Dual Principle: individual and
collective goodness. Section 6 shows that the definition of individual good-
ness used by Parfit needs to be revised to account for our intuitive verdicts
about some comparisons involving unequal outcomes. Section 7 discusses two
ways of determining which of two outcomes is overall better when they are
incomparable in terms of individual goodness. Section 8 delivers concluding
remarks.
2 This is not how Parfit formulates this conclusion in (1984, p. 388) and (2017, p. 153). The
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This paper makes several substantive and interpretative assumptions.
First, the Repugnant Conclusion is formulated and understood here in
terms of the goodness of lives. To determine how good a life is, we need a
theory of well-being and a theory of intrapersonal aggregation of well-being.
This is not how Parfit states the Repugnant Conclusion in his work. In Reasons
and Persons (1984, p. 388) and ‘Future People . . . ’ (2017, p. 129), he tends to talk
about the ‘quality of life’. This is either insufficiently general or potentially
misleading. This term is often used to refer to a person’s average well-being
per some unit of time: you might say that your quality of life was higher when
you resided in Zurich than it is now that you live in Kathmandu. But, unless
we already know that the average is the correct principle of intrapersonal
aggregation of well-being, we should not limit our discussion in this way. For
the same reason, we should not assume any particular theory of well-being.
The formulation of the Repugnant Conclusion in terms of the goodness of
lives is neutral in these respects.
Second, the following assumptions will be helpful. A life is good (bad) just
in case it is good (bad) for the person living it, and neutral just in case it is
neither good nor bad for that person. Let’s assume that one life can be better
than another and that two lives can be equally good. We can understand
an equivalence class of equally good lives as a life goodness level. Let’s further
assume that there are reasonably fine-grained life goodness levels which can
be represented with integers, in such a way that higher numbers correspond
to better life goodness levels, the differences in numbers correspond to the
differences in life goodness, positive (negative) numbers correspond to good
(bad) lives, and zero corresponds to a neutral life.
Third, let’s assume that there are three basic evaluative relations: better
than, equally good, and worse than. Outcomes not related in any of these
ways are incomparable. As a substantive assumption, this is justified by rea-
sons of simplicity: it can be relaxed when necessary. It is also warranted as
an interpretative assumption. In Reasons and Persons, Parfit introduces a fourth
relation – imprecise equality – and he discusses it further in ‘Can We Avoid the
Repugnant Conclusion’ (2016).3 However, imprecise equality is not mentioned
in ‘Future People . . . ’ even once, so it is reasonable to assume, at least ini-
tially, that he is breaking ground on a novel approach which does not involve
imprecise equality.
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II.2. The wider theoretical framework
It is important to understand Parfit’s wider theoretical framework in which the
Wide Dual Principle is embedded.
Firstly, at the foundation of this principle is the claim that to be created with
a good life is an existential benefit for the created person and to be created with
a bad life is an existential harm. This is a controversial move because the terms
‘benefit’ and ‘harm’ are typically used either in the comparative temporal sense or
else in the comparative counterfactual sense.4 Parfit, following Jeff McMahan (1981;
2009; 2013), suggests that these terms can be used in the noncomparative sense as
well. Although being created with a good life is not better for the created person,
it is nonetheless good for that person.
Secondly, we can compare an outcome in which Sally has a good life with
an outcome in which Sally does not exist even though in the former case
Sally is benefited only in the noncomparative sense. The former outcome is
better because the former outcome is good for Sally and the latter outcome is
not good for anyone. Moreover, we can compare outcomes in which different
people exist by comparing how good one outcome is for the people who
exist in it with how good another outcome is for the people who exist in
it.
Thirdly, the Wide Dual Principle presupposes the view that the goodness
of outcomes is intrinsic. That is, the goodness of an outcome depends on its
intrinsic properties and not on its relation to other outcomes.5 On this view,
‘better than’ is a transitive relation: if X is better than Y, and Y is better than
Z, then X is better than Z. Moreover, assessment of outcomes is invariant under
permutations of identities of possible members of the domain. Put differently,
it matters only what life goodness levels are occupied by members of the
distribution, and not who is living any particular life or whether the compared
outcomes contain some or none of the same people. An outcome in which
Ann exists at 50 and Beth does not exist is as good as an outcome in which
Ann does not exist and Beth exists at 50.6
These claims might be challenged, but they are simply assumed in the fol-
lowing discussion. The primary aim of this paper is to examine the implications
of the Wide Dual Principle, not to question its foundations.
4 To be benefited in the comparative temporal sense is to be made better off than one was
before. To be benefited in the counterfactual comparative sense is to be made better off than one
would have been otherwise.
5 Earlier in the same article (especially pp. 137-144), Parfit argues at length against the rival
view that the goodness of outcomes is at least sometimes essentially comparative. For a comprehensive
discussion of this view, see Larry Temkin’s Rethinking the Good (2012).






/pq/article-abstract/70/278/114/5556076 by Princeton U
niversity user on 05 August 2020
118 MICHAL MASNY
III. THE WIDE DUAL PRINCIPLE
III.1. An intuitive gloss
The following example will help us get an intuitive grasp on how the Wide
Dual Principle is intended to work. Suppose that you are choosing between
two meals, A and B. Let us agree that two considerations determine the
overall goodness of a meal: tastiness and healthiness. One of two meals is
in one way better if it is tastier and in another way better if it is healthier.
Although goodness in one of these respects is not reducible to goodness in the
other respect, the overall evaluative relation between the two meals can be
determined roughly as follows. If A is healthier and tastier than B, then A is
overall better than B. If A and B are equally tasty and equally healthy, then
they are overall equally good. If A is healthier than B, and A and B are equally
tasty, then A is overall better than B. Most interestingly, comparisons seem
possible even if A is tastier and B is healthier. For instance, if A is much tastier
than B, and B is only slightly healthier than A, then A is plausibly overall better
than B.7
The Wide Dual Principle works in an analogous way. Instead of meals, tasti-
ness, and healthiness, we are concerned with outcomes, individual goodness
(benefits to each), and collective goodness (benefits to all).
III.2. Individual and collective goodness
As we have seen, Parfit thinks that there are two ways of benefiting (and
harming) people more: benefiting each more and benefiting all more. He thinks
that there are correspondingly two basic ways in which one of two outcomes
can be better: individually better and collectively better. In his discussion, Parfit
sometimes uses one pair of terms and sometimes the other. For clarity, only
the latter pair of terms will be used in this paper.
What are the conditions for individual and collective betterness? According
to Parfit (2017, pp. 153–5), one of two outcomes is individually better if all people
who exist in this outcome have better lives than all people who exist in the
other outcome. And one of two outcomes is collectively better if it has the higher
7 To say that is to accept that there is some rate of trade-off between healthiness and tastiness
of a meal and that this rate is not far from 1:1. This raises a fundamental question about the
metaphysics of value: what makes it the case that two values irreducible to one another or
some further common value can be traded-off at all and in any particular way? Any genuinely
pluralistic axiology faces this question (Johann Frick (pc.) calls it the Deep Problem of Pluralism).
This includes Parfit’s Wide Dual Principle which treats individual and collective goodness as
mutually irreducible. As we will see shortly, Parfit clearly thinks that these two values can
sometimes be traded-off but he does not provide an answer to the aforementioned question.
Unfortunately, this paper does not offer it either. Let’s just assume that individual and collective
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total sum of life goodness. The relations of individual and collective betterness
together determine the overall betterness relation.
III.3. Implications of the Wide Dual Principle in equality cases
In his article, Parfit discusses only equality cases in which all people who exist in
any particular outcome have equally good lives. This section, too, considers
only such cases.8 Let us see how the Wide Dual Principle handles them.
Let C(X) be the level of collective goodness and I(X) be the level of individual
goodness of an outcome X. For any two outcomes, X and Y, there are five
types of equality cases:
Type 1: C(X) = C(Y) and I(X) = I(Y)
Type 2: C(X) > C(Y) and I(X) > I(Y)
Type 3: C(X) = C(Y) and I(X) > I(Y)
Type 4: C(X) > C(Y) and I(X) = I(Y)
Type 5: C(X) > C(Y) and I(X) < I(Y)
Type 5 cases are the most interesting because considerations of individual and
collective goodness pull us in the opposite directions. Let us run through some
examples of each type.
Consider a Type 1 case:
Case 1: A 2 people at level 60
B 2 (other) people at level 60
In Case 1, outcome A is collectively as good as B because the total sum of
goodness of lives in the two outcomes is the same. A is individually as good as
B because the people in A and B have equally good lives. A is thus overall as
good as B.
Consider a Type 2 case:
Case 2: A 2 people at level 60
B 1 person at level 50
In Case 2, A is collectively better than B. A is also individually better than B
because each person in A has a better life than each person in B. Since A is
better in both respects, A is overall better than B.
It is worth emphasising that, in the context of individual goodness in equality
cases, it does not matter how many individuals exist in each outcome. Just like
the presence of an additional meal of some kind does not change the tastiness
of the option in which only meals of this kind are consumed, the presence of
8 As we will see in Section 6, introducing inequality raises a number of important compli-
cations. Most importantly, worries of pervasive incomparability will force us to at least consider
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an additional person with an equally good life in outcome A does not change
A’s individual goodness.
Consider a Type 3 case discussed by Parfit (2017, pp. 150–2):
Case 3: A 1 person at level 100
B 10 people at level 10
In Case 3, A is collectively as good as B, but A is individually better than B.
The Wide Dual Principle implies that A is overall better than B.
Is this the right verdict? The question is whether it would be better if some
amount of benefits was shared between fewer or more people. Parfit thinks
the former. This is also the spirit of Larry Temkin’s Consolidate Additional Benefits
View (2012, p. 68).
Similar considerations apply to cases in which people have bad lives.
Consider:
Case 4: A 1 person at level −100.
B 10 people at level −10
In Case 4, A is collectively as good as B, but B is individually better than A,
so B is overall better than A. Whereas it is plausible to consolidate benefits, it
seems that we should disperse harms (compare: Temkin 2012, p. 76).
Consider a Type 4 case discussed by Parfit (2017, p. 154):
Case 5: A 2N people at level 100 exist
B N people at level 100 exist
In Case 5, A is individually as good as B, but A is collectively better than B.
The Wide Dual Principle implies that A is overall better than B. As earlier, two
outcomes are tied according to one criterion, and the other criterion serves
as a tiebreaker. The question here is whether it would be better, other things
equal, if more rather than fewer people with good lives existed. Unsurprisingly,
considering the commitment to the claim that being created with a good life
is a benefit, Parfit’s principle implies that it would be better. It also has the
plausible implication that it would be better if fewer rather than more people
with bad lives existed.
Finally, let’s consider a Type 5 case discussed by Parfit (2017, p. 155):
Case 6: A 1 million people at level 1,000
Z 100 billion people at level 1
Parfit thinks that the assessment of this case is straightforward. He writes:
‘In [Case 6], Z would be collectively better than A, since Z would together benefit people
roughly a hundred times more. But Z would be individually worse than A, since Z would
benefit each person roughly a thousand time less. The lives of the people in A would be
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fact would do much more to make this outcome better. On this version of the Wide Dual
Principle, Z would be worse than A’ (2017, p. 156).
Parfit recognises that if Z were better than A, then this would be an instance
of the Repugnant Conclusion. He comments:
‘As these remarks show, the Wide Dual Principle does not imply the Repugnant Con-
clusion’ (p. 157).
IV. THE REPUGNANT CONCLUSION
IV.1. Getting clearer on how to assess Type 5 cases
Is Parfit correct when he says that the Wide Dual Principle does not imply
the Repugnant Conclusion? To answer this question, we must consider Type
5 cases in more general terms. In the cases of interest (like Case 6), X is
individually better than Y, whereas Y is collectively better than X. For short:
I(X) > I(Y) and C(Y) > C(X). Parfit does not provide a rigorous method for
evaluating such cases. He merely suggests that
‘We can plausibly believe that slightly greater benefits to each would be outweighed by
much greater benefits to all, and slightly greater benefits to all would be outweighed by
much greater benefits to each’ (2017, p. 155).
Call it Parfit’s Rule. There are at least two possible interpretations of it.
The first interpretation is in terms of differences in value: I(X) − I(Y) and C(Y)
− C(X). There are two versions of this interpretation. ‘Much greater’ and
‘slightly greater’ can track either the absolute differences in value, or else the
relative differences in value. On the first version, X would be individually much
better and Y would be collectively slightly better just in case:
(I (X) − I (Y)) > k > (C (Y) − C (X)) , for some elected k > 0
On the second version, X would be individually much better and Y would be
collectively slightly better just in case:
(I (X) − I (Y)) ≥ n × (C (Y) − C (X)) , for some elected n > 1
The ‘differences in value’ interpretation is unsatisfactory. In Case 6,
I(A) − I(Z) = 999 and C(Z) − C(A) = 99 billion. Thus, on the first ver-
sion of this interpretation, if A is much better individually, then Z is also much
better collectively. And if Z is slightly better collectively, then A is only slightly
better individually. It depends on the value of k. On the second version of this
interpretation, either A is slightly better individually and Z is much better col-
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slightly better collectively (otherwise). On either version, Parfit’s Rule does not
apply to Case 6, and Parfit thought it does, so it not an accurate interpretation
of Parfit’s view.9
The second interpretation of Parfit’s Rule is in terms of ratios: |I(X)|/I(Y)
and |C(Y)|/C(X).10 Again, there are two versions. ‘Much greater’ and ‘slightly
greater’ can track either the absolute value of ratios or else the relative value of
ratios. On the first version, X would be much better individually and Y would
be slightly better collectively just in case
(|I(X)| / I(Y)) > k > (|C(Y)| / C(X)), for some elected k > 1
On the second version, X would be much better individually and Y would be
slightly better collectively just in case:
(|I(X)| / I(Y)) ≥ n × (|C(Y)| / C(X)), for some elected n > 1
Both versions of this interpretation are consistent with Parfit’s comments about
Case 6. There, |I(A)|/ I(Z) = 1,000 and |C(Z)|/ C(A) = 100. So, the in-
equalities from the previous paragraph hold for a wide range of k>1 and
n>1.
However, the first version faces a problem. To accommodate Parfit’s com-
ments about Case 6, it would be necessary to claim that, for one outcome
to be much better individually or collectively than the other, it would have to
be more than 100 times better in that respect. After all, Z is 100 times better
collectively than A and it is regarded as only slightly better collectively. But
the differences in the goodness of lives of different people do not seem to be
as dramatic in the real world, so the Wide Dual Principle would be left with
no bite in many relevant cases.
The second version of this interpretation avoids this problem. To accommo-
date Parfit’s comments about Case 6, it would only be necessary to claim that
for one outcome to be much better individually than the other, this outcome
would have to be 10 times better individually than the other is collectively.
The second version is also more intuitive. In Type 5 cases, we are interested
in how strongly considerations of individual goodness favour one outcome
relative to how strongly considerations of collective goodness favour the other.
Consequently, Parfit is best understood as implicitly committed to the following
sufficient condition for overall betterness:
9 Parfit calls it Case Ten (2017, p. 155).
10 Taking the modulus (absolute value) of one of the values in each ratio is necessary to
correctly account for cases in which we compare outcomes in which people have bad lives.
Otherwise in Case 7 (A–: 1 million people at –1,000; Z–: 100 billion people at –1), A– would turn
out to be overall better. It is not, or at least it is not according to the logic of the Wide Dual
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(1) For any two outcomes X and Y, such that I(X) > I(Y) and C(X) < C(Y),
if (|I(X)|/ I(Y)) ≥ 10 × (|C(Y)|/ C(X)) then X is overall better than Y.
IV.2. The Wide Dual Principle implies the Repugnant Conclusion
In Case 6, one outcome is significantly better individually than the other is
collectively. Parfit does not discuss cases in which the reverse is true: one out-
come is significantly better collectively than the other is individually. However,
as we have seen, when speaking about the Wide Dual Principle in general
terms Parfit claims that ‘slightly greater benefits to each would be outweighed
by much greater benefits to all’ just like ‘slightly greater benefits to all would
be outweighed by much greater benefits to each’ (2017, p. 155). Considering
this, it is plausible to assume, at least initially, that Parfit would also endorse
another sufficient condition for overall betterness that mirrors (1):
(2) For any two outcomes X and Y, such that I(X) > I(Y) and C(X) < C(Y),
if (|C(Y)|/ C(X)) ≥ 10 × (|I(X)|/ I(Y)) then Y is overall better than X.
That is, one of two outcomes is overall better if collective goodness favours it
10 times more than individual goodness favours the other outcome.
Now, consider a variant of Case 6:
Case 8: A 1 million people at level 1,000
Z+ 10 trillion people at level 1
This case is like Case 6, except that the number of people in Z+ is 100 times
greater than it was in Z. In Case 8, C(A) = 1 billion, C(Z+) = 10 trillion,
I(A) = 1,000, and I(Z+) = 1. So, Z+ is collectively better than A, and A is
individually better than Z+. How much better? |C(Z+)|/C(A) = 10,000 and
|I(A)|/I(Z+) = 1,000. Now, if (2) is true, then Z+ is overall better than A.
But this is just an instance of the Repugnant Conclusion. So, contrary to what
Parfit claims, the Wide Dual Principle implies the Repugnant Conclusion.
Did Parfit see it coming? It is unclear. In the last paragraph of his article,
Parfit writes:
‘These remarks do not show that, if we can justifiably appeal to this Wide [Dual]
Principle, we can thereby avoid the Repugnant Conclusion. If we believe that it would
always be in one way better if there existed more people who would together have a
greater total sum of benefits, this belief might be one premise of more complicated and
forceful arguments for the Repugnant Conclusion.’ (2017, p. 157).
It is important to note that the Wide Dual Principle is not just one
of the premises in a complex argument for the Repugnant Conclusion.
Rather, the preceding considerations show that the Wide Dual Principle alone
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IV.3. Possible amendments
Can the Wide Dual Principle be saved on Parfit’s behalf ? There are at least
three amendments worth considering.
The first possible amendment turns on the idea that individual goodness is
so much more important than collective goodness that the greater collective
goodness of one outcome can never outweigh the greater individual goodness
of another outcome. In particular:
(3) For any two outcomes X and Y, such that I(X)>I(Y) and C(X)<C(Y),
X is overall better than Y.
This claim, (3), avoids implying the Repugnant Conclusion but is otherwise
dubious because it implies that in the following case A is overall better than B.
Case 9: A 1 person at level 80.
B 1 million people at level 79.
If (3) is true, then, in equality cases, the role of collective goodness is reduced
to breaking ties.11
But it is difficult to make sense of this role in the context of the theoretical
underpinnings of the Wide Dual Principle. This view turns on the thought
that a person who is created with a good life (and we can assume that level 79
corresponds to a very good life) is genuinely benefited and that adding people
with good lives to an outcome genuinely makes that outcome better. Yet, (3)
implies that there is no number of people at 79 whose existence would be better
than the existence of a single person at level 80, and hence a cap on how good
an outcome containing people at 79 can be.
Moreover, (3) has even more implausible implications regarding compar-
isons of outcomes in which people have bad lives. In the following case, it
implies that B– is better than A–.
Case 10: A– 1 person at level –80.
B– 1 million people at level –79.
Finally, (3) is clearly not a good interpretation of Parfit’s view who, as we
have seen, writes that ‘slightly greater benefits to each would be outweighed
by much greater benefits to all’ (2017, p. 155).
The second possible amendment makes room for the claim that individual
goodness is more important than collective goodness in another way. The
thought is that although greater collective goodness of one outcome can some-
times outweigh greater individual goodness of another outcome, it is easier
11 This role would be perhaps more extensive in inequality cases. Section 7 discusses the view
that when two outcomes are incomparable in terms of individual goodness, then the overall






/pq/article-abstract/70/278/114/5556076 by Princeton U
niversity user on 05 August 2020
ON PARFIT’S WIDE DUAL PRINCIPLE 125
for a difference in individual goodness to outweigh a difference in collective
goodness than conversely. In particular, the suggestion is to replace (2) with:
(4) For any two outcomes X and Y, such that I(X)>I(Y) and C(X)<C(Y),
if (|C(Y)|/ C(X)) ≥ 100 × (|I(X)|/ I(Y)) then Y is overall better than X.
This kind of amendment obviously cannot help avoid the Repugnant Con-
clusion, whatever value of n is chosen instead of ‘10’. If (4) is accepted instead of
(2), then simply a greater number of people at level 1 will be required to make
an outcome in which only such people exist better than another outcome in
which everyone exists at level 1,000.
The third possible amendment explores a somewhat different avenue. Recall
that Parfit suggests that ‘slightly greater benefits to each would be outweighed
by much greater benefits to all’ (2017, p. 155). In Case 8, benefits to each in
A are not slightly greater; they are 1,000 times greater! Perhaps such a great
difference in individual goodness cannot be outweighed by any difference in
collective goodness. Indeed, Parfit seems to be considering something like this
in the penultimate sentence of his article:
‘We might justifiably believe that great losses in the quality [goodness] of people’s lives
could not be outweighed by any increase in the sum of benefits, if these benefits came
in the lives of people whose quality of life would be much lower’ (2017, p. 157).
Perhaps one outcome can be at most 10 (or 5) times individually worse than
another, for it to possible that the former’s greater collective goodness can
outweigh the latter’s greater individual goodness. Call this proposal Local Lexical
Superiority. When treated as a constraint on something like (2), it gives us:
(5) For any two outcomes X and Y, such that I(X)>I(Y) and C(X)<C(Y),
if (|C(Y)|/ C(X)) ≥ 10 × (|I(X)|/ I(Y))
and (|I(X)|/I (Y)) ≤ 10
then Y is overall better than X; otherwise X is overall better than Y.
On this view, an outcome with greater collective goodness is overall better
than another outcome with greater individual goodness only if either people
in both outcomes have very good lives or else people in both outcomes have
barely good lives. So, the Repugnant Conclusion is false.
Despite a promising start, this amendment does not succeed. Earlier in the
same article, Parfit argues at great length (against Larry Temkin) that overall
goodness of outcomes must be intrinsic and that ‘intrinsically better than’ is a
transitive relation. But one cannot accept (5) in addition to these two claims.
To see that, consider:
Case 11: A 1,000 people at level 100
B 1 million people at level 10
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What does the Wide Dual Principle imply in this case? Compare A and B.
|C(B)|/C(A) = 100 and |I(A)|/I(B) = 10, so (5) implies that B is overall better
than A. Now, compare B and C. |C(C)|/C(B) = 100 and |I(B)|/I(C) = 10, so
(5) implies that C is overall better than B. Now, if ‘overall better’ is a transitive
relation, then C is overall better than A. However, |I(A)|/I(C) = 100, so (5)
implies that A is overall better than C.
This is a contradiction. Proponents of the Wide Dual Principle face a
choice. One of the following claims must give way: (i) goodness of outcomes
is intrinsic; (ii) ‘intrinsically better than’ is a transitive relation; (iii) greater
collective goodness of one outcome can sometimes outweigh greater individual
goodness of another outcome; or (iv) Local Lexical Superiority. Parfit is clearly
committed to the first three and his arguments for them are compelling, so
Local Lexical Superiority must give way.
There is a further worry about Local Lexical Superiority. It must be asym-
metric in the sense that one could not hold both that, for any two outcomes X
and Y:
(a) X can be at most n times individually worse than Y, for it to be possible
that X’s greater collective goodness can outweigh Y’s greater individual
goodness; otherwise the individually better outcome is overall better.
(b) Y can be at most n times collectively worse than X, for it to be possible
that Y’s greater individual goodness can outweigh X’s greater collective
goodness; otherwise the collectively better outcome is overall better.
Local Lexical Superiority, as used earlier in this section, refers just to (a). To
see why it is impossible to hold both (a) and (b), consider:
Case 12: A 10 people at level 100
B 100,000 people at level 1
In Case 12, |C(B)|/C(A) = 100 and |I(A)|/I(B) = 100. If (say) n = 10, then
(a) implies that A is overall better than B, whereas (b) implies that that B
is overall better than A. Assuming that ‘better than’ is asymmetric, this is a
contradiction.
The contradiction can be avoided by rejecting (a) or (b). Since (b) outright
implies the Repugnant Conclusion, (b) is a more natural candidate for the
axe. However, since (a) and (b) are symmetric, and individual and collective
goodness are both supposed to be genuinely good-making considerations, it be-
comes difficult to see what considerations could justify one-sided Local Lexical
Superiority. We are back to square one: if anything, we should embrace (2).
IV.4. Should we despair?
The Wide Dual Principle cannot avoid implying the Repugnant Conclusion.
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Let’s begin by noting that the Wide Dual Principle has some advantages
over the Wide Principle which Parfit discussed in his previous work. Firstly,
these two principles differ in terms of the requirements for overall betterness in
Type 5 cases. Consider some outcome X in which 1 million people at level 1,000
exists (like A in Case 6). What is the minimum number of people at level 1 that
must exist in another outcome Y for Y to be overall better than X? According
to the Wide Principle, the minimum number is 1 billion. According to the
Wide Dual Principle, assuming (2), the minimum number is 1 trillion. This is a
major difference. It is partly for this reason that the instance of the Repugnant
Conclusion implied by the Wide Dual Principle is less repugnant and perhaps
easier to accept than the instance of the Repugnant Conclusion implied by
the Wide Principle (and its impersonal equivalent: the Total Principle).12
Secondly, these two principles differ in terms of how the Repugnant Conclu-
sion is reached. Many people find the Wide Principle (and the Total Principle)
unattractive because it is not explicitly concerned with the goodness of life of
each person who exists in a given outcome. For instance, the Wide Principle is
incompatible with the spirit of Larry Temkin’s Consolidate Additional Bene-
fits View mentioned earlier because it regards as equally good an outcome in
which fewer people with very good lives exist and another outcome in which
many people with barely good lives exist, as long as the collective goodness of
the two outcomes is the same. It is partly in this sense that the Wide Principle
regards people merely as containers of well-being.13 By contrast, the Wide
Dual Principle is concerned not only with collective goodness but also with in-
dividual goodness: with how good each life is. At the same time, the Wide Dual
Principle recognises that, whenever one good-making consideration (collective
goodness) significantly outweighs the other good-making consideration (indi-
vidual goodness), a concession has to be made and the Repugnant Conclusion
accepted.
V. THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF INDIVIDUAL AND
COLLECTIVE GOODNESS
As shown in Section 4.1, Parfit is implicitly committed to at least one sufficient
condition for overall betterness, (1), in Type 5 cases in which the two com-
ponents of the Wide Dual Principle conflict. This sufficient condition fails to
12 The thought that there are more or less repugnant instances of the Repugnant Conclusion
is not entirely new. For instance, Nils Holtug (2010, p. 254) argues that prioritarianism in variable-
population contexts implies what he calls the Super-Repugnant Conclusion: for any outcome in which
many people exist, all with very good lives, there is a better outcome in which many more
different people exist, all with barely good lives, and in which the total sum of life goodness is
lower.
13 Parfit illustrates this objection memorably: ‘The greatest mass of milk might be found in a






/pq/article-abstract/70/278/114/5556076 by Princeton U
niversity user on 05 August 2020
128 MICHAL MASNY
determine which of the two outcomes is overall better in the following case
mentioned by Parfit (2017, p. 155):
Case 13: A N people at level 100.
B 2 N people at level 75.
(2) does not determine it either. In Case 13, |C(B)|/C(A) = 1.5 and |I(A)|/I(B)
≈ 1.33, so one ratio is not 10 times greater than the other, and neither compo-
nent is much more prominent than the other.
As Parfit aptly observes, to determine which of these two outcomes is better,
‘we must compare the relative importance of these two ways of benefiting peo-
ple more’ (2017, p. 155). He adds: ‘I can only start to do that here’. Ultimately,
however, Parfit does not offer a way of extending the Wide Dual Principle to
such comparisons.
There are at least two moves worth discussing on Parfit’s behalf. The first
one is to accept the Incomparability View according to which outcomes like A and
B in Case 13 are incomparable in terms of overall goodness. More generally,
the claim is that in Type 5 cases, whenever neither outcome is at least 10 times
collectively better than the other is individually and neither outcome is at least
10 times individually better than the other is collectively, the two outcomes are
overall incomparable.
The Incomparability View has several disadvantages. Firstly, it will make
the Wide Dual Principle regard very many pairs of outcomes as over-
all incomparable. Very few, if any, real-life cases are like Case 6 (Parfit’s
Repugnant Conclusion case). More are like Case 13 in which the differences
between outcomes in terms of individual and collective goodness are not as
dramatic. Secondly, we may well wonder what could possibly make it the
case that the irreducible values of individual and collective goodness can be
traded-off in some cases but cannot be traded-off in other cases. One would
also expect a deeper metaphysical explanation of the particular claim that
one ratio must be at least 10 times greater than another, which seems to be
the cut-off point between comparable and incomparable outcomes on this
view.14
The following Simple View is superior. It holds that, in Type 5 cases, overall
betterness is determined by simply comparing the prominence of the two
components. If one outcome is individually better to a greater extent than the
other is collectively better, then the former outcome is overall better. And, if one
outcome is collectively better to a greater extent than the other is individually
better, then the former outcome is overall better. Finally, if one outcome is
collectively better to the same extent that the other is individually better, then
they are overall equally good. More precisely:
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(6) For any two outcomes, X and Y, such that I(X) > I(Y) and C(X) < C(Y),
if |I(X)|/I(Y) = |C(Y)|/C(X) then X and Y are overall equally good;
if |I(X)|/I(Y) > |C(Y)|/C(X) then X is overall better than Y;
if |I(X)|/I(Y) < |C(Y)|/C(X) then Y is overall better than X.
Consider the application of this Simple View to Case 13. There,
|C(B)|/C(A) = 1.5 and |I(A)|/I(B) ≈ 1.33. Collective goodness favours out-
come B to a greater extent than individual goodness favours outcome A, so B
is overall better than A.
To further illustrate this view, we can compare Case 13 with
Case 14: A N people at level 100
B– 2N people at level 70
The difference is that in B− people exist at 70, not at 75. This is not a major
difference, but it is enough to change the verdict about overall betterness. In
Case 14, |C(B−)|/C(A) = 1.4 and |I(A)|/I(B) ≈ 1.43. So, A is overall better
than B−.
The Simple View has a minor disadvantage relative to the Incomparability
View. Although the Wide Dual Principle implies the Repugnant Conclusion
when paired with either view, the Wide Dual Principle paired with the Incom-
parability View implies a slightly less repugnant instance of this conclusion.
On the Simple View, a smaller number of people with barely good lives are
required to make an outcome overall better than an outcome in which fewer
people with very good lives exist. That said, that number of people with barely
good lives would still be greater than what is required by the Wide Principle.
On the other hand, the Simple View has a number of theoretical virtues.
Firstly, as we have seen, it avoids the worry of pervasive incomparability in
equality cases. And it does so in a very intuitive way. The Wide Dual Principle
paired with the Simple Proposal is premised on the idea that individual and
collective goodness are equally important. Whenever these considerations pull
us in the opposite directions, we compare how strongly they pull us in these
directions.
Secondly, the Simple View has ‘less’ metaphysical explaining to do. Al-
though one still needs to explain what makes it the case that irreducible values
can be traded-off at all and in this particular way, there is no need to explain
why in some cases they can be traded-off and in others, they cannot. And,
as long as we accept that individual and collective goodness can always be
traded-off by way of comparing ratios, not much hinges on the assumption
that these two values are equally important. For instance, we would not avoid
the Repugnant Conclusion by giving greater weight to individual goodness.
Assuming that they are equally important, however, will simplify some of the
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We can call the conjunction of the Wide Dual Principle with the Simple View
the Revised Wide Dual Principle. This principle is ‘revised’ because accepting the
Simple View is a possible departure from Parfit’s view and in particular from
Parfit’s Rule. Although Parfit’s Rule is a pair of merely sufficient conditions for
overall betterness, the claim that one good-making consideration needs to be
much more prominent than the other in order to outweigh it seems to occupy a
central role in his thinking about the Wide Dual Principle. The Simple View
rids us of the ‘much’ qualification.
Let’s summarise the implications of the Revised Wide Dual Principle in
equality cases:
Type 1: if C(X) = C(Y) and I(X) = I(Y), then X is overall as good as Y;
Type 2: if C(X) > C(Y) and I(X) > I(Y), then X is overall better than Y;
Type 3: if C(X) = C(Y) and I(X) > I(Y), then X is overall better than Y;
Type 4: if C(X) > C(Y) and I(X) = I(Y), then X overall better than Y;
Type 5: if C(X) > C(Y) and I(X) < I(Y), and . . .
. . . |C(X)|/C(Y) > |I(Y)|/I(X) then X is overall better than Y.
. . . |C(X)|/C(Y) < |I(Y)|/I(X) then X is overall worse than Y.
. . . |C(X)|/C(Y) = |I(Y)|/I(X) then X is overall as good as Y.
Despite its complex appearance, in equality cases, the Revised Wide Dual
Principle is extensionally equivalent to:
X is overall at least as good as Y iff |I(X)| × C(X) ≥ |I(Y)| × C(Y).15
It is worth emphasising that, although these principles are extensionally equiv-
alent, the latter is not how the Revised Wide Dual Principle arrives at the afore-
mentioned implications. Simply multiplying individual and collective goodness
does not seem to have any normative significance whereas the previously dis-
cussed comparisons in terms of individual and collective goodness do.
VI. UNEQUAL OUTCOMES AND INDIVIDUAL BETTERNESS
VI.1. The problem
The preceding discussion of the Wide Dual Principle was limited to equality
cases in which all people in any particular outcome have equally good lives.
How can we apply this principle to inequality cases in which comparisons
involve at least one unequal outcome? Parfit does not provide an answer. He
merely notes that ‘inequalities raise complications that are best considered
elsewhere’ (2017, p. 152). These complications do not arise at the level of
15 Once again, taking the modulus (absolute value) of one of the values is necessary to correctly
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collective betterness because comparing outcomes in this respect is just a
matter of comparing the sum totals of life goodness. Rather, they arise at the
level of individual betterness.
VI.2. The Simple Definition
Parfit’s simple definition of individual betterness can be paraphrased as follows:
The Simple Definition: For any two outcomes, X and Y, X is individually better than Y just
in case all people in X have better lives than all people in Y; X and Y are individually
equally good just in case all people in these outcomes have equally good lives; otherwise
X and Y are individually incomparable.16
This definition fared well in equality cases, but it runs into trouble in inequality
cases. Firstly, very many pairs of unequal outcomes will be deemed incompa-
rable in terms of individual goodness. Secondly, often only a minute change
to a life goodness level of one of many people will be sufficient to force a shift
from comparability to incomparability. To see that, consider:
Case 15: A 10 people at level 100
B 1 person at level 101 and 9 people at level 100
Thirdly, on the initially plausible assumption that when two outcomes are
individually incomparable they are also overall incomparable, the Simple
Definition implies that A and B are incomparable in terms of overall goodness.
But, intuitively, they are not: B is overall better than A. Finally, on the same
assumption, and if the same people exist in A and B, then the Simple Definition
violates a highly plausible version of the Weak Pareto Principle which holds
that if one of two outcomes is better for someone and worse for no one,
and the same people exist in both outcomes, then it is overall better. These
considerations suggest that the Simple Definition should be rejected in favour
of some more relaxed definition of individual betterness.
VI.3. Two dominance definitions
In Case 15, some people in B have better lives than all people in A and no people
in B have worse lives than any people in A. Plausibly, B is individually better
than A. This reasoning applies not only to same-number but also to different-
number cases. It underlies the following candidate definition of individual
betterness:
The Simple Dominance Definition: For any two outcomes, X and Y, X is individually better
than Y just in case some people in X have better lives than all people in Y and no people
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in X have worse lives than any people in Y; X and Y are individually equally good just
in case all people in these outcomes have equally good lives; otherwise X and Y are
individually incomparable.
This definition would be an improvement on the Simple Definition, but it also
faces several problems. Firstly, consider:
Case 16: A 5 people at level 100 and 5 people at level 50
B 5 people at level 100 and 5 people at level 50
The Simple Dominance Definition implies that A and B in Case 16 are indi-
vidually incomparable. But, intuitively, A and B are individually equally good
even if different people exist in these two outcomes. The individual better-
ness relation should be invariant under permutations of identities of possible
members of the domain.
Secondly, consider:
Case 17: A 5 people at level 100 and 5 people at level 50
B+ 5 people at level 100 and 5 people at level 60
The Simple Dominance Definition implies that A and B+ in Case 17 are
individually incomparable. Intuitively, however, B+ is individually better than
A. If the 5 people at level 100 were the same people, and the remaining 5
people were the same people, B+ would be a Pareto Improvement on A: it
would be better for some and worse for no one. Plausibly, B+ is better than
A even if different people exist in these outcomes. To capture this verdict, we
need a concept akin to that of Pareto Improvement which is insensitive to
people’s identities. We can call it
Permutation-invariant Pareto Improvement: For any two outcomes which contain the same
number of people, X and Y, X is a Permutation-Invariant Pareto Improvement on Y just
in case there exists a bijection between X and Y such that every person in X is at least
as well off as their counterpart in Y, and there are some people in X who have better
lives than their counterpart in Y.
Note that all Pareto Improvements are Permutation-invariant Pareto Improve-
ments but the converse is not true.
These two considerations suggest another definition of individual betterness
which we might call
The Sophisticated Dominance Definition: For any two outcomes, X and Y, X is individually
better than Y just in case (i) some people in X have better lives than all people in Y and
no people in X have worse lives than any people in Y or (ii) X is a Permutation-Invariant
Pareto Improvement on Y. X and Y are individually equally good just in case (iii) all
people in in these outcomes have equally good lives or (iv) X and Y are permutations of
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This Sophisticated Dominance Definition of individual betterness accounts for
the intuitive verdicts about all cases considered earlier in this section as well
as those about equality cases considered earlier. Conditions (ii) and (iv) cover
only same-number cases, whereas (i) and (iii) also extend to different-number
cases. (i) and (ii) do not entail one another; neither do (iii) and (iv).
However, despite being an improvement on the Simple Definition and the
Simple Dominance Definition, even this Sophisticated Dominance Definition
faces the worry of pervasive incomparability. Consider:
Case 18: A 10 people at level 100
B 1 person at level 101 and 9 people at 1
The Sophisticated Dominance Definition implies that A and B in Case 18 are
incomparable in terms of individual goodness, whereas many people have the
intuition that A is individually better than B. Perhaps we can do better.
There is a further worry. There is no apparent way of measuring how good
individually an outcome is and how much better individually one outcome is
than another.17 This is important because in Type 5 cases considerations of
individual goodness and collective goodness pull us in the opposite direc-
tions. To determine which of the two outcomes is overall better, we must
compare how much better one outcome is individually relative to how much
better the other outcome is collectively. If we cannot find a way of quan-
tifying the difference in individual goodness in inequality cases, we may
be unable to determine the overall betterness relations between many such
outcomes.
VI.4. The Average Definition
One definition, which avoids the problem with quantifying individual goodness
and which initially seems to avoid the worry of incomparability is
The Average Definition: For any two outcomes, X and Y, X is individually better than Y iff
the average life goodness level in X is higher than in Y; X and Y are individually equally
good just in case the average life goodness in these outcomes is the same; otherwise X
and Y are individually incomparable.
The level of individual goodness of an outcome is according to this definition
simply the average life goodness level. This definition accounts for the intuitive
verdicts about the cases considered earlier in this section but it faces other
significant worries.
Firstly, the Revised Wide Dual Principle paired with this definition violates
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The Mere Addition Principle: Adding people with good lives to an outcome does not make
that outcome overall worse, other things equal (Parfit 1984, p. 420).
To see that, consider:
Case 19: A 10 people at level 100
B 10 people at level 100 and 10 people at level 10
Suppose that the people at level 100 in these outcomes are the same people.
Now, |C(B)|/C(A) = 1.1 and |I(A)|/I(B) ≈ 1.82. Since 1.82 > 1.1, A is overall
better than B. This is a surprising result because B is just like A except that
some further people with good lives exists in B.
Secondly, and much more worryingly, the Revised Wide Dual Principle
paired with this definition implies
The Sadistic Conclusion: It would sometimes be overall better to add people with bad lives
rather than people with good lives to an outcome, other things equal (Arrhenius 2000,
p. 251)
To see that, consider the following alternatives:
Case 20: A 10 people at level 100
B 10 people at level 100 and 10 people at level 10
C 10 people at level 100 and 1 person at level −100
Again, suppose that the people at level 100 in these outcomes are the same
people. Now, |C(B)|/C(C) ≈ 1.22 and |I(C)|/I(B) ≈ 1.49. Since 1.49 > 1.22,
C is overall better than B. This is highly implausible because both B and C
are outcomes which result from adding extra people to A. In C we are adding
a person with a very bad life whereas in B we are adding some people with
good lives.
These two problems for the Revised Wide Dual Principle paired with the
Average Definition arise only in inequality cases. However, this provides little
consolation. Most cases we will ever encounter in the real world are inequality
cases. One of the key aims of investigating population axiology is that the
results of doing so might at some point inform our decisions about how many
people will ever exist, and at what life goodness levels.
VII. THE SILENT COMPONENT APPROACH
The Simple Definition, the Simple Dominance Definition, and the Sophisti-
cated Dominance Definition all face the worry of pervasive incomparability
in terms of individual goodness.
How significant is this worry? A natural thought is that when two outcomes






/pq/article-abstract/70/278/114/5556076 by Princeton U
niversity user on 05 August 2020
ON PARFIT’S WIDE DUAL PRINCIPLE 135
incomparable in terms of overall goodness. We can call this the Contaminating
Component Approach because incomparability at the level of one component
‘contaminates’ the overall betterness relation. If this approach is correct, then
accepting any of the aforementioned definitions of individual betterness comes
at the price of pervasive incomparability at the level of overall betterness.
Note, however, that outcomes are only incomparable in terms of individual
goodness. They are never incomparable in terms of collective goodness because
all we have to do is to do is calculate the total sum of life goodness for each
outcome. And we are ultimately interested in comparisons in terms of overall
goodness.
These observations provide a basis for the following suggestion: whenever
two outcomes are incomparable according to one criterion, then this criterion
is ‘silent’ and the other criterion determines the overall betterness relation.
Call this the Silent Component Approach.
Why accept this approach? Firstly, it allows one to adopt the Sophisticated
Dominance Definition of individual betterness without worrying about incom-
parability at the level of overall goodness. The resulting view accommodates
our intuitions about cases considered throughout this essay, does not violate
the aforementioned version of the Weak Pareto Principle or the Mere Addition
Principle, and avoids the Sadistic Conclusion.
Secondly, an attentive reader might have noticed that the worry of incompa-
rability was looming even before we turned to comparisons involving unequal
outcomes. To see that, consider:
Case 21: A No one exists
B 1 person at level 100
Recall, from Section 2.2, that Parfit claims that we can compare an outcome in
which no one exists with an outcome in which someone with a good life exists.
The latter outcome is supposed to be better because it is good for someone
whereas the former outcome is good for no one.
But how are we supposed to capture this thought with the Wide Dual Prin-
ciple or its Revised version? Comparing collective goodness is straightforward:
the total sum of life goodness in an empty outcome is 0, so B is collectively
better than A. But what about individual goodness? Is it also 0 or is it un-
defined? Though the former answer would simplify applying the Wide Dual
Principle to such cases, the latter answer is more plausible. This is because
individual goodness is supposed to track how much each person is benefited
or how good each life is. Sensitivity to this issue is what allows the proponent
of the Wide Dual Principle to avoid the objection that persons are merely
containers of well-being. But there is no answer to the question ‘how good
are the lives of people?’ in an empty world. Individual goodness of an empty
outcome is undefined and hence empty and non-empty outcomes are individ-
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empty and non-empty outcomes would be incomparable in terms of overall
goodness. Thus, all of the previously considered definitions of individual bet-
terness, including the Average Definition, need to be paired with the Silent
Component Approach to deliver the verdict that B is overall better than A in
Case 21.
That said, the Silent Component Approach is not without challenges.
Neither is decisive but it will be instructive to discuss them anyway.
Firstly, the Silent Component Approach has its limitations. In particular,
this approach paired with a principle that recognises at least three independent
good-making considerations that admit of incomparability gives rise to cycles
at the level of overall betterness.
To see that, consider the following case. Let C1, C2, and C3 be three
components used to determine the overall goodness of some outcome. The
following table displays how each of the three outcomes (X, Y, and Z) ‘scores’
in these respects. ‘–’ denotes an undefined value.
Case 22: C1 C2 C3
X 2 1 –
Y – 2 1
Z 1 – 2
How do these outcomes compare? Firstly, X and Y are incomparable in terms
of C1 and C3, and Y is better than X in terms of C2. If the Silent Component
is true, then Y is overall better than X. Second, Y and Z are incomparable in terms
of C1 and C2, and Z is better than Y in terms of C3. So, Z is overall better than Y.
Third, X and Z are incomparable in terms of C2 and C3, and X is better than
Z in terms of C1. So, X is overall better than Z. Thus, there is a cycle at the level
of overall betterness. If ‘better than’ is transitive and asymmetric, then this is
a contradiction.
It is important to stress that such cycles arise only if the overall betterness
relation is determined on the basis of at least three components that admit of
incomparability. The Revised Wide Dual Principle has only two components,
only one of which admits of incomparability, and therefore avoids this worry.
Perhaps this is serendipitous. But that the Silent Component Approach has
troubling implications when paired with some other view is not enough to
force us to reject this approach as the supplement to the Revised Wide Dual
Principle.
Secondly, one might worry that, when paired with the Silent Component
Approach, the Revised Wide Dual Principle loses its advantages over the
Wide Principle (and the Total Principle). After all, whenever two outcomes
are incomparable in terms of individual goodness, the Revised Wide Dual
Principle issues the same verdicts as the Wide Principle. This is perhaps most
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Case 23: A– 1 million people at level 1,000 and 1 person at level 1
Z+ 100 billion people at level 2
Admittedly, the resulting view loses one of its advantages advertised earlier.
The instances of what we might call the Inequality-involving Repugnant Conclusion
implied by the Revised Wide Dual Principle paired with the Silent Component
Approach are not ‘less repugnant’ than the instances implied by the Wide
Principle. The total sum of life goodness needed to make an outcome in which
only people at level 2 exist better than A− is the same for both views.
That said, the Revised Wide Dual Principle paired with the Silent Compo-
nent Approach retains the other, more important advantage. Unlike the Wide
Principle, this view remains explicitly concerned with the goodness of life of
each person in a given outcome. It is only when two outcomes are incompa-
rable in terms of individual goodness that sensitivity to this matter does not
translate into reasons to favour one outcome over the other.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle is an ingenious proposal. It is
unfortunate that Parfit’s project of articulating this principle was terminated
by his untimely death. This paper may be seen as an attempt to complete
this project. It identified various theoretical choices that need to be made
by a proponent of this principle, and discussed the relative merits of each
alternative. Let us summarise some of these results first and then see where
they leave us.
Section 4 argued that the Wide Dual Principle cannot avoid the Repugnant
Conclusion unless one of the following claim is rejected: (i) goodness of out-
comes is intrinsic; (ii) ‘intrinsically better than’ is transitive; or (iii) the greater
collective goodness of one outcome can sometimes outweigh the greater indi-
vidual goodness of another outcome. Parfit is clearly committed to and offers
compelling arguments for the first two claims in ‘Future People, . . . ’ and his
earlier work. The third claim seems to be at the core of Wide Dual Principle
and rejecting it has highly implausible consequences.
This section further argued that the instances of the Repugnant Conclusion
implied by this principle are ‘less repugnant’ than the instances implied by
the Wide Principle (and the Total Principle) and that the Wide Dual Principle
does not regard people merely as containers of well-being. Thus, accept-
ing the Repugnant Conclusion may be more justifiable than it is commonly
advertised.
Section 5 discussed the relative importance of individual and collective
goodness. The proponents of the Wide Dual Principle owe us an explanation
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and collective goodness can be traded-off at all. Any genuinely pluralistic
axiology faces this problem, so perhaps it can be temporarily set aside. On
the assumption that these two good-making considerations can sometimes be
traded-off, it is important to determine whether they can always be traded-off.
According to the Incomparability View, the answer is no: whenever neither
outcome is much better individually nor collectively than the other, the two
outcomes are overall incomparable. According to the Simple View, the answer
is yes: whenever one outcome is individually better to a greater extent than
the other is collectively better, the former is overall better (and vice versa).
The latter view is more extensionally adequate and has ‘less’ metaphysical
explaining to do. The Simple View does not presuppose that individual and
collective goodness are equally important, but it is helpful to assume, at least
initially, that they are. Because accepting the Simple View could be a departure
from Parfit’s outlook, it was dubbed the Revised Wide Dual Principle.
Section 6 discussed comparisons involving unequal outcomes. In such cases,
the Simple Definition of individual betterness delivers a number of counterin-
tuitive verdicts, regards very many pairs of outcomes as individually incompa-
rable, and there seems to be no way of measuring how much better individually
one outcome is than another. The Sophisticated Dominance Definition is an
improvement in the first respect and partially in the second respect, but it
does not avoid the third worry. The Average Definition avoids the latter two
problems but comes at the price of rejecting the Mere Addition Principle and
accepting the Sadistic Conclusion.
Section 7 considered whether incomparability at the level of individual
goodness implies incomparability at the level of overall goodness. According
to the Contaminating Component Approach, it does. According to the Silent
Component Approach, it does not: whenever two outcomes are incomparable
in terms of individual goodness, the comparison in terms of collective goodness
alone determines which of two outcomes is overall better. Taking this latter
approach allows one to accept something like the Sophisticated Dominance
Definition and avoid pervasive incomparability at the level of overall goodness.
Where does this leave us? It is unclear. The combination of the Revised
Wide Dual Principle with the Sophisticated Dominance Definition and the
Silent Component Approach might be the best version of the Wide Dual
Principle. But it remains to be seen whether our best metaphysics of value
makes room for this view. And there is the Repugnant Conclusion, too. A
large part of Parfit’s intellectual life was spent trying to find ways to avoid it.
The Wide Dual Principle is an addition to the long list of theories that share this
implication. Notably, this implication is not avoided despite treating individual
goodness as one of two values of the highest importance. Considering this,
perhaps we should embrace the Repugnant Conclusion after all. Principles
and intuitions that underlie arguments in favour of this conclusion are part
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is false, however strong it may be, is only a solitary rock in the middle of an
ocean, repeatedly crushed by waves.
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